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THE ROLE OF THE HORRIBLE IN
UNDERSTANDING MEDICINE:
A MEDITATION ON DAVID
ROTHMAN'S STRANGERS AT THE
BEDSIDE
Edward P. Richards, Ill*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Unconscious bodies wheezing away on mechanical ventilators, un
knowing patients injected with cancer cells, unfeeling physicians prolonging
the death agony o f hopelessly premature babies-these are some of the
horribles that s hape contemporary medical policy.
These horribles make medicine a uniquely alien world to outsiders
such as the lawyers, ethicists and other non-medical personnel discussed
by Professor David Rothman in his excellent book, Strangers at the

Bedside.• Professor Rothman dares to discuss the underlying politics of
the bioethics movement, questioning its overall benefit to patients. In this
essay I test the proposition that the bioethics movement has, on balance,
contributed to a decline in patient autonomy.
I do not suggest that bioethicists have acted improperly or dishon
orably. Nor do I suggest that physicians, left on their own, will always
protect their patients' interests. M y thesis is that the h orrible facts of
medical practice, combined with its scientific basis, lead outsiders into
misunderstandings that ultimately harm patients. To make m y bias clear,
I write as a quasi-insider. I am a law professor and lawyer, but I am
trained in medical science and research. I am periodically involved in
scientific research2 and routinely involved in medical decision-making. I
write extensively for physicians and biomedical engineers.
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law. B.A. , Rice
University; J.D., University of Houston Law Center; M.P. H., University of Texas School of Public
Health. The author would like 10 thank Professor Nancy Levit, Dr. J. Alexander Gold and Dr.
Charles Walter for their ideas and discussions which lead to this article.
I. DAVID J . ROTHMAN , M.D., STRANGERS A T THE BEDSIDE (1991) (hereinafter ROTHMAN).
2. Arnold Miller et al., Birth Clustering, 1990 PROC. OF THE AM. STAT. Soc'Y, (forthcoming
1 992); B arry B. Bounds & Edward P. Richards III, Using Objects to Communicate Legal Information,
COMPUTER Soc'Y PRESS OF THE IEEE, 9 PHO E NIX CONF. ON COMPUTERS AND COMM. 766-771 (1990);
Arnold R. Miller & Edward P. Richards I II, Statistical Analysis of Medical Malpractice Costs:
Analysis of Incident Reporting Times, PROC . OF THE Bus. AND EcoN. STAT. SEc. OF AM. STAT.
Soc'Y, 327 (1 989); R. R. Sharp, III & Edward P. Richards Ill, Molecular Mobilities of Soluble
Components in the Aqueous Phase of Bovine Chroma/fin Granules, 491 810CHIMICA AND 810PHYSICA
ACTA 260 (1977); R. R. Sharp, III & Edward P. Richards III, Analysis of the Carbon JJ and Proton
NMR Spectra of Bovine Chroma/fin Granules, 497 BIOCHIMICA AND BtoPH�SICA AcTA 14 (1977); R.
R. Sharp III & Edward P. Richards Ill, NMR Evidence for an Acetylcholme ATP Complex, 64, #3
BIOCHEMICAL AND BIOPHYSICAL RES. COMM. BS I ( 1 975).
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I believe that most bioethicists have been distracted by horrible facts,
allowing themselves to be blinded to the profound ethical implications of
.
the organizational and financial shifts that are fundamentally changing
the physician-patient relationship.3 While ethicists are increasingly con
cerned with rationing medical care and the perverse impact of third-party
payors providing incentives to physicians who provide less care to their
patients, this concern comes many years too late.
The 1970s saw medicine become a capital intensive business. The
1980s saw competition and entrepreneurship become watchwords for med
ical practice. During the same period, legal academics and bioethicists
focused on topics such as informed consent and right to die. These are
important issues, but their true significance is

as symptoms of the struc
tural changes in medical practice. Focusing on these surface issues inad

vertently provided ethical cover for third-party payors and governmental
entities• that use issues such as right to die to manipulate public opinion
regarding access to care for the elderly and the seriously ill.�
This essay begins with the genesis of Professor Rothman's book. I
then e xplore why medicine is an alien culture to non-physicians. While
this essay is not meant to be a comprehensive review of Strangers at the
Bedside, I do track Professor Rothman's p resentation of different ex
amples of bioethical reforms, extending his historical analysis with a
discussion of how these reforms are co-opted by the marketplace. This
discussion centers on how patient empowerment has failed as an effective
philosophy for assuring ethical decision-making. I conclude with sugges
tions for rethinking the role of ethicists and other strangers at the bedside.
II.

THE ORIGIN OF STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE

Professor Rothman is a narrative historian who writes o n contem
porary medical topics. He is an excellent scholar who is not reluctant to
advocate his views of right and wrong.6 Strangers at the Bedside grew
out of an invitation by the Columbia School of Medicine to have Professor
3· Ironically, traditional
physician-dominated ethical codes
were concerned with the financial
.
_mh"
conflicts
ent in practicing medicine:
"What a far cry from the days when med
ical 'ethics'
consisted of condemning ec onom
1c
· 1mpro
·
pnettes such as fee splitting
and advertising
ROTHMAN,
s11pra note I, at 200.
4 For example, the Oreg
on Plan for health care rationing
has been favorably received in
;uch of the media, despite its fundamen
tal unfairness to poor wom
en and children. See David J.
Othm an, Rot10111ng .Uft, 39
IS New You Review OF
Books, Mar. S, 1992, at 32.
S. Many phys1c1ans arc dee
ply suspicious of ethicists·
·
In a brief period the prof
essio
· na 1 eth"1c1st
· has become a fixture on
.'.
.
the med ical scene. At
thc mo�c_ nt ethic
ist is a self-descriptive
term, and any entrepreneur
can claim the title.
R e mem.,.,r that the author
ity and soc·ia1 acceptance
. •ury
of phrenologists in the early nineteenth
�m
WU such that the
.
facu lty of a ramous Amenc
an university discussed the establishment
of 1 departmenr f h
0 P reno1ogy and eventually
rejected it by a margin of only one vote.
Wh atevcr t he competence
of ethic'ists as a group,
physicians must not allow them selves to
be on the sider
a
��8cc�l: ��cc: t�ei � ions
<�or1c A. Silver,
with patients.
;
�;
3
i: �:�c��:'.
N
1
6. David J. Ro1hman MD
·
Doesn •1 mea
u n
More Deaths', N.Y. TIME
al H.
S, Apr. 20, 1991, § I,
·

·

·"

·

•

E���;is��

·
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Rothman join their ranks. 7 This invitation allowed Profess o r Rothman to.
become deeply involved in the process of delivering medical care and
performing medical research. The resulting book is deeply skeptical of
many aspects o f established medicine. It also reflects, h owever, some of
the complexity of m edical practice and is perhaps equally skeptical of the
simplistic solutions being proposed f or reforming the medical care system.

Strangers at the Bedside is subtitled, "A history of how law and
bioethics transformed medical decisionmaking." This theme is developed
through an analysis of three areas: 1 ) medical experimentation; 2) refusing
care for severely impaired newborns; and 3) terminating lif esupport and
substituted decisionmaking for the terminally ill. The common thread in
each example

is

a highly publicized horror story that p recipitates a

legislative or judicial revision o f existing practices. In every case, the
physician's power was reduced and third parties to the physician-patient
relationship gained a right to intervene in the decision-making. Patients
gained real power in some cases, theoretical power in others and lost
power in a few.
Professor Rot hman humanizes the physicians involved in some of
these horrible situations by recognizing that there are alternative perspec
tives that make otherwise brutal behavior explicable.8 In doing so, he
steps into dangerous territory. The great power of the horrible anecdote
as a rhetorical device is the ease with which persons who attempt to
mitigate, the horror are painted a s condoning the behavior in question.
Medical care and research is fraught with horrible situations and competing
interests. Recognizing competing i nterests, even accepting that the com
peting interests are compelling, is not the same as denying the horror of
the situation.9
III.

THE TWO CULTURES PROBLEM

For those who work with medical policy issues, Professor Rothman's
discussion of his socialization into the medical school culture may be the
most fascinating part of his book.10 Medicine is an alien culture for non
physicians. 11 The most difficult p roblem for outsiders working in alien
cultures is achieving a proper balance between gaining enough knowledge
and empathy to accurately portray the culture, and going native.12
In general, science-based cultures are fundamentally alien to persons
without scientific training. C. P.

Snow called this the "two cultures"

7. ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 5.
8. ROTHMAN, supra note l, at 218.
9. Laurie Zoloth-Dorfman & Bridget Carney, The AIDS Patient and the last ICU Bed:
Scarcity, Medical Futility, and Ethics, 17 QRB 175-81 (1991).
10. ROTHMAN, supra note I, at 135, see text surrounding note.
11. While not meant to denigrate the knowledge and understanding o f the nursing profession,
the primary legal relationship is between physician and patient. This is based on the physician's sole
authority to make medical decisions as defined in most state licensing acts.

12. Going native, in the context of writing about medicine, usually means an uncritical
acceptance of the norms of the particula r medical group studied. In the case of physicians and
scientists turned ethicists and philosophers, however, it frequently means a wholesale rejection of
scientific values in favor of vaguely spiritual "individual centered" philosophies.
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problem; 13 the difficulty of communication between pers��s enculturated
.
in the sciences or engineering and persons m the humamt1es. The blame
for this failure to communicate rests on both cultures.
Scientific disciplines, medicine in particular, train and reward for
narrow technological expertise. 14 With the demise of traditional liberal
education in the universities, many of these practitioners have focused on
the sciences since the beginning of high school. This focus is o ften _to the
exclusion of other life activities . essential to
understanding of the human

condition. is

emotional maturity and

Scientific and technical training

also inculcates a belief in knowledge and progress
irrespective of their impact on society.16

as

unalloyed goods,

In turn, persons with only humanities training are often profoundly
illiterate in the maths and sciences.17 This illiteracy impedes their reading
and evaluating primary scientific material. Scholars who confine them
selves to secondary sources, such as journalist popularizations, 18 lay
oriented simplifications19 and articles that themselves are base'tl only on
secondary sources, are handicapped in their appreciation of the complexity
and nuances of scientific and medical problems. This may manifest as
either romantic, superficial generalizations o f scientific ideas, or as a
lumping together of well-reasoned research and National Inquirer hysteria
mongering. 20
13. c. P. SNOW, THE Two CULTURES AND THE SctENTIFIC REVOLUTION (1959).
14. J. Allan Hobson, Symposium, Psyc hiatry as Scientific Humanism: A Program Inspired by

Ro�rto Unger's Passion, 81 Nw.U.L.REv. 791 (1987).

IS. The image of lhe callous physician, locked in perpetual adolescence, is a perennial literary
I heme. W. Somerset Maugham, who was qualified as a surgeon, wrote an early classic, Of Human
Bondage (1915). A more contemporary view can be found in SAMUEL SHEM, HousE OF Goo (1978).
16. In lb�n's Enemy of the People, we sec a physician crushed by the discovery that his fellow
citizens would rather not know that the spa that provided the economic base for their town was
conraminated by dangerous bacteria.

17. This, of course, only applies to !hose who shun the sciences in rheir formal education.
Even those withoul formal scientific training, given an interest in a scientific area, may systematically
educate t hemsclves if they arc willing to invest the time to learn the necessary background materials .
Such self-education is different, however, from the superficial glibness that lawy ers are taught to
develop 10 advocate a clienr's narrow inlerests in a specific c a s e. The lawyer's task is to appear
convinci n g to a j ury or judge, not to understa nd the complexities of a discipline. In some ways, the

lawyer who is ignoran1 of the discipline is at an advantage. A l awyer skilled in the underlying area
_
must put aside the complexities and ambiguities to be an effective advocate· and must sometimes
even wr stle the cthi�al q�estion of when oversimplification becomes fraud. L wycrs who only know

�

�

_

�

superficial o�crs1mphficau�n� re less often chafed by the ethics of dissembling.
_
18. This is not to d m1msh the value of such popularizations. As an example, James Gleick's
book . Chaos (1.987), provided an excellent, though simplified, introduction 10 the particular problem
posed by non·hn ear systems such as wealher forecasting. This provided a gateway
inlo the primary
_
\ources for mdav1du�ls who had not k nown of lhc chaos theory, but were
willing to investigate these
�our.:es. It 15 1he pnmary sources, however, that present
both the complexity and the limitations of

_i

_

the theory. l·or cumplc• Gl·1·ck
al
'

79, d.ISCusses how c h aos theory can help to understand the
.
.
.
d�na m1.:\ of cp1dcm1cs su c h as AIDS. The primary sources, such
as Heben w. Hethcote & James
A_. 't_ or�e. Gonorrhea Transmission Dynamics and Control, in LECTURE NOTES
IN BIOMATHEMATICS
(S. l.evm e d. 1984) illustrate tha while epidemiological systems are non·linear
, chaos theory only
_
plays a li mited role an understanding r he ir dynamics.

�

_

.

I�.

This g cnera is typified by Scientific American. While skillfully wrirten,
these articles often

_
111nort• m.:onvc�1cn
1 fac1s lhal gel in lhe way of the flow of rhe story.
20. Tim is, of co urs e not limited to non-scienlists. Both scientists
and non-scientists were
rcprcm11cd in 1hc prolifera ti on of articles and theories 10 explain crop
circles.
,
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THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF MEDICINE

Of all the science-based systems, medicine is at once the most familiar
and the most alien. It is the most familiar because its concerns are those
of every person: life, death, and, most importantly, health. The notions
of healing, the province of medicine,21 are embedded in every culture.
Even in the United States, the world leader in high technology medical
care, 22 a substantial part of the population relies on non-scientific23 and
lay healers. 24 The persistence of these healers testifies to both the enduring
belief that healing is a natural activity that does not require university
training and the real limitations in medical treatment.
Medicine is the most alien of sciences for three reasons. First, it
demands objectivity in the face of human suff ering. Objectivity is difficult
in all disciplines.25 Pure objectivity, the ability to judge facts on their
own, without reference to outside, non-factual considerations, is impos
sible. Objectivity is most difficult in medicine because of the unavoidable
identification of physicians, as fellow humans, with their p atients. Finan
cial and emotional considerations26 make even relative objectivity difficult
in medicine. These considerations delay acceptance of new knowledge by
established physicians27 and encourage other physicians t o be overly eager
to adopt unproven ideas. 28
Second, medicine is a relatively young discipline. We see an enormous
medical research establishment and f orget that while scientific medicine
may have its roots in Paracelsus's studies of pharmacology,29 it did not
2 1. The late Ruel Stallones,

M.D., M.P.H.,

founding Dean of University of Texas School of

Public Health, was always careful to talk about medical care and medical care delivery. He believed
that it was critical for medical policymakers to understand thal we do not care for health, nor do
we deliver health. We care for disease and we deliver disease care.
22. High technology in medical care is not limited to the use of machines on patients. The
most pervasive use of technology is pharmaceuticals, which now account for approxima1ely ISOJo of
the medical care dollar.
23. Chiropractors are the most numerous and powerful of these practitioners.
24. Many of these people reject physician care for non-financial reasons. In some parts of the
south, the lay midwife (midwives with no formal medical training, as distinguished from nurse
midwives) movement is religiously-based and is targeted toward middle class su burban women.
25. The relevant comparison in law is n o t with jurisprudential theories, but with the management
of conflicts of interest. The diffusion of alternative dispute resolution and preventive law into
traditional litigation-oriented law practice and teaching is a good parallel with the problems of
paradigm shift in science.
26. The human genome project is a good example. Every scientist involved in the project has
a substantial financial interest in its progress. Even the usual interests of university researchers in
federa l grant money is now complicated by their simultaneous holding in private genetic technology
concerns.
27. The classic work is THOMAS

s.

KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed.

1972). The relevant point is that scientists' reputations and personal psychologies become dependant
on the validity of the theories with which they are identified. This undermines their willingness to
accept new scientific knowledge.
28. Two dangerous manifestations of this are the rush by physici ans to be "first on the block"
with trendy new therapies and the willingness of "alternative healers" to promote quasi-mystical
nonsense.
29. Paracelsus (1493- 1541) broke away from the Galenic tradition and used empirical studies
to determine the effects of drugs.
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begin to flower until the work of Pasteur30 and Semmelweis31 in

!he later
�
�

that gomg o a
part of the 1880s. It was not until sometime after
.
physician increased a patient's chances of survival. Med1cme as a hospi al

l�.

based, capital intensive business,

epitomized by the research medical

center, is a product of the 1950s and 1960s.

.
The values that shape the contemporary physician-patient relationship

were formed before medicine had effective treatments. The great historical
tradition of medicine is, at best, one of dedicated emotional support for
patients. At worst, it is a history of fraud and deception. Physicians are
expected to practice a discipline that has changed fundamentally during
one practice lifetime. It is not surprising that traditional medical values
have failed to provide clear guidance for solving the problems of modern
medical practice.
Third, and most critical, physicians must deal with horrible facts.
The scientific details seem the most difficult barriers for non-scientists
seeking to understand medical practice. Yet medical practice is just as
difficult to understand for persons skilled in other branches of the life
sciences, for whom the science of medicine is perfectly comprehensible.
What is most alienating for both groups is that the objective facts of
much of medical practice are horrifying. The process of surgery is the
cold-blooded rending of flesh and tearing of organs. Chemotherapy is the
systematic poisoning of the patient in hopes of killing the tumor faster
than the patient. The management of chronic diseases such as renal failure,
AIDS and other HIV-related diseases, diabetes, congestive heart failure,
and untold others, is not one of cure, but of slowing and mitigating
death.
Appreciating and accommodating this horror is a major part of the
training of physicians and, as Professor Rothman found, those who would
understand the complexities of medical ethics. Medical training is often
criticized for its inhumanity.32 It is questionable, however, how humane
medical training can be and still prepare physicians to deal with inhumane
situations. This is not a question of becoming "hardened" to human
30. Pasteur's work on the biological origin of disease was the foundation of modern medica l
science. Interestingly, Pasteur's work was widely accepted precisely because h e was a chemist with
strong political supporters outside of organized medicine.
31. Semmelweis was the first to use statistical analysis when he studied
the incidence and cause
of childbed fever. Unlike Pasteur, he was a physician and thus subject
to the sanctions of the medical
profession. While he was able to reduce the mortality of the disease
from I20Jo to 1.5% of pregnant
w�men, his work was ignored and he was driven from practice
in Vienna. His sin was to show that
chi ldbed fever was an iatrogenic illness, spread by the
very physicians from whom the women sought
.
relief.
32. Some of these criticisms are well taken. John M.
Colford, Jr., M.D., & Stephen J. McPhee,
M.D., The Ravelled Sleeve of Care; Managing the Stresses
of Residency Training, 261 JAMA(R)
889-93 (1989). The best founded of these objections is
to the long hours demanded in many training
programs. Alan D. Dedrick, M.D., The Eighty-Hour
Workwe e k; Residency Friend or Foe? 144 AM.
J·
CHILD. 857 (1990). These take an unacceptable toll on both
the physicians and the patients.

�JS.

David A. Asch, M.D., & Ruth M. Parker, M.D., The Libby
Zion Case: One Step Forward or Two
Steps
ckward? 318 NEw ENG. J. MED. 771-75 (1988); Kenneth E.
Thorpe, Ph.D., House Staff
�
.
Super\l/s1on and Workmg
Hours; Implications of Regulatory Change in New York State 263 JAMA(R)
'
3177-81 (1990).

�
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suffering, although a certain degree of detachment is fundamental to a
physician's emotional survival. Physicians, and those who would under
stand medical practice, must learn not to let the horror of individual
suffering blind them to the best medical decision-making for that individ
ual.
This is best understood in the context where physicians themselves
recognize that they are unable to be sufficiently objective. It is considered
bad practice, if not unethical, for physicians to treat members of their
own families. Traditionally, physicians have treated their colleagues' fam
ilies without charge to discourage the physicians from treating their own
families. 33 Termed professional

courtesy, this practice recognizes that

objective decision-making is impossible when the physician is emotionally
involved with the patient. Contrary to the usual assumption that patients
would get better medical care if physicians only cared more about them,
caring a lot about patients as individuals is very destructive to the patient's
medical care. When a physician cares deeply about an individual, that
physician is torn between undertreatment because of denial and overtreat
ment because of fear.
A.

Do Horrible Facts Make Physicians into Strangers?

Professor Rothman addresses the role of horrible facts in his chapter
entitled ''The Doctor as Stranger.'' The most powerful paragraph in this
chapter, and, in my view, one of the most insightful in the literature of
cross-discipline studies of medical practice, deals with Professor Rothman's
internalization of the significance of horror in isolating physicians from
society:
Physicians' shoptalk is not so much boring as it is filled with tales that
would strike outsiders as tragic and gruesome, stories that no one else
would want to hear around a dinner table, or for that matter, anywhere
else. Let one personal expe ri ence clarify the point. No sooner did I join
a medical school faculty than I met with the chairman and chief of
service of v arious clinical departments (pediatrics, medicine, and so on)
to explore what interest each department might have in social medicine.
The sessions were informal, but much of these first conversations turned
on "interesting cases," which typically involved descriptions of devastating
illness. . . . At first I thought these stories were an initiation ritual was a historian trained to do archival work up to the stuff of medicine?
But I slowly learned that this was not a right of passage but a sharing
of anecdotes and gossip; they assumed that because I was part of the
faculty, I, too, would be fascinated by the shoptalk. Then, in turn, when
friends asked about these meetings, I would share the stories; but as I
watched their faces get tense and drawn, I learned to put aside the
question and change the subject. The substance of m edicine, I was
learning, was easiest talked about with med cal pe� ple, �o t bec� use of
its technical or dry qualities, but because of its scarmess m exposmg the
frailty of human beings and the dimensions of suffering. 34

�

33. Richard c. Wasserman, M.D., et
319-22 (1 989).
34. ROTHMAN, supra note l, at 135.

al,

Health Care of Physicians' Children, 83 PEDIATRICS
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This description of Professor Rothman's internalization of the
significance of horrible facts is doubly compelling. First, Professor Ro hman

�

was not unfamiliar with horrible facts in related contexts. In particular,
his studies of asylums for the mentally ill forced him to confront suffering
and helplessness in the face of disease.JS Yet the horrors of his resear�h
into asylums did not prepare him for the pervasive impact of horror m
the routine practice of medicine. While not discussed by Professor Rothman,
it is possible that a key difference between his approach to his asylum
research and his initiation into medical culture was an assumption that
the conditions in asylums were improper and should be fixed.
One can imagine one's non-medical friends (or oneselO e arnestly
discussing the horrors of asylums in the way that persons discuss problems
in society that can be fixed, even if they are not being fixed; "If people
were just more dedicated, if we would just spend more money, if we
would just listen to the experts..." Such caring, but detached, discussion
is possible because the problems seem tractable, at least theoretically.
Most importantly, the problems of asylums are not deeply disquieting
because they are other people's problems; few people see themselves as
potential inmates in asylums. The horrors of medical practice cannot be
escaped because they are the horrors of life itself.
Professor Rothm an's account is also compelling because he articulates
how this initiation separated him from non-physicians. His realization of
the effects of his stories on his non-medical colleagues is a profound
insight for those, enculturated into the medical ethos, who would bridge
the gap between medical and non-medical worlds. Professor Rothman
uses this insight as part o f his persuasive picture of the physician as a
stranger to society. 36 He leaves unanswered the question as to the extent
that this is a societally-imposed, as well as self-imposed, separation.
Professor Rothman's personal solution was to change the subject,
rather than to discuss difficult medical cases with his non-physician
colleagues. This raises the critical question: was this a decision on Professor
Rothman's part to avoid a discussion which made him uncomfortable,37
or does it reflect his realization that he would be ostracized by his non
.
mcd1cal colleagues if he continued with his tales of horror?
I cannot answer this question for Professor Rothman's colleagues. I

find most persons without medical training profoundly uncomfortable
when confronted with specific, graphic discussions of medical facts. Many
H · The overcrowding was desperate - beds jammed one nex1
10 the other in the
""<lrd, and along the hallways - and the fihh ubiquitous,
so that virulent intestinal diseases
hkc 'h11clla 'Prcad through the population. Staffing was
minimal ' one attendant to fifty
·
·
or "''Y i nmar cs · and ini·urics common, wit
· h res1'dents abusing themselves or assaulting
or hen.
ROTHMA•N .t SHEi'.,.
• M . R OTHMAN, THE WILLOWBROOK
W.us, at 15 (1984).
36· Th" exiends lo the cs1ran1cmcn1 of many physicians
from rheir families and ' given their
.
"immun
11)· 'landing and weahh • rheir re I a 1·1vc 1ac k of involvemen
·
t in politics ' ROTHMAN ' supra note
I. al I 3.1-.17.
l>HIO j

J7. A dC\:i�ion which was available because
as
.

oul\ld<'r in1cre\U.

an

·

· 'd er/ou1s1der
ms1
·
' he could move on to his
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law students have difficulty in dealing with realistic discussions of the
medical facts in torts cases. Mor e troubling are medical law and policy
experts who are emotionally unprepared to face the

detailed factual

analysis that is necessary to understand certain difficult medical problems. 38
This is not limited to squeamishness over unplea s a n t physiological
phenomena. It extends to an unwillingness to confront situations where
ethically proper decisions conflict with generally accepted notions of
individual liberty. 39
This unwillingness to face horrible facts often manifests as a
schizophrenic combination of vilification and sentimentalization of medical
issues. It also leads outsiders to fixate on issues that pose fascinating
ethical questions, but have de minimus impact on medical practice. As
discussed later, this becomes destructive when general medical policy is
determined by these aberrant anecdotes.
B.

The Importance of Shared Knowledge

Professor Rothman was struck by the use of case-based, or, as he
puts it, "case-by-case" reasoning in clinical decision-making. 40 He sees
this as resolving cases without rules and believes that persons with a legal
mind-set are much more likely t o "search for the rule that should be
imposed o n a particular case than to see how the case can be resolved
without it. "41 He is troubled because he sees this case-based reasoning
used to avoid general ethical rules by finding exceptions that undermine
the proposed rule:
Physicians, as I have learned, frequently bring this case-by-case approach
into the consideration of social and ethical issues. Offer them a principle
to consider (for example, that patients have the right to know their
diagnosis), and they will often come up with a case (drawn from
experience42) that they believe undercuts and thereby negates the principle
(for instance, the seeming inappropriateness of informing a seventy-five
year-old woman about to go o ff to her grandchild's wedding that she
has an inoperable and slow-growing brain tumor). Describe a case in the
ethics o f decision making at t he end of life that occurred at another
hospital, and the physicians will initially try to obviate the problem by
claiming that those doctors made egregious errors in their treatment (for
example, t h is patient should never have needed a respirator in the first
place). It is as though their ability to resolve the incident at hand absolves
them of the need to formulate or respect general principles. If they can
38. Feeling revulsion does not, in itself, discredit a scholar's work . There are subjects, such as
the Nazi concentration camp medical experiments, that properly horrify all who study them. Horror
of the subject of inquiry is only relevant when it distorts the scholarship. One must attempt to
understand the rational behavior behind even horrible acts such as the Nazi death camps.
39 . RAEL J. ISAAC & VmoINIA c. AllMAT, MADNESS IN mE STREETS (1990).
40. "Perhaps the most remarkable feature of clinical decision making is the extraordinary
reliance on a case-by-case approach." ROTHMAN, supra note I, at 7.
41. ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 8.
s just as Jaw
42. What many outsiders do not realize is that physicians use medical hypothetical
professor's use legal hypotheticals . It matter s Jess that the counter-example be �e �I � that it could
.
.
be real. Jn many cases, clinical hypotheticals are composites, drawn from the phys1c1an s own practice,
the practice of colleagues, and the general medical mythology .
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cite a case in which the proposed rule does not hold, then they have
ostensively discredited not only the rule, but the search for rules. In
short, clinicians start with the case at hand, and if they have their way,
stop with the case at hand.43
Medicine does use case-by-case reasoning. There is an old joke,
however, that whenever a physician begins a sentence with "in my clinical
experience," you should be prepared for a statement that contradicts
common-sense, if not physical law. Outsiders often misunderstand this
process, however,

because they do not appreciate physicians' shared

background. No other graduate and post-graduate education is so consistent
between schools. This is due to comprehensive accreditation requirements
and to a shared belief in what a physician should know. While not all
medical schools have the same curriculum, and many medical educators
disagree on what medical education should be, these differences are
insignificant compared to the tumult in disciplines such as law.
As an example, my greatest surprise in moving into law teaching was
that there were no requirements on the content of required courses. As
long as your course has the proper title, no one inquires into what you
teach. I soon had the second surprise of finding that law school accreditation
requirements make minimal demands on what courses must be required,
irrespective of their content. This combination of idiosyncratic course
content, and limited accreditation requirements on required courses, allows
students from the same law school to graduate with little shared knowledge.
This is exacerbated when comparing the shared knowledge of students
from different law schools.44
There are pedagogic reasons why a lock-step curriculum is not desirable
in law45 (and history, sociology, etc.). This does not obviate the cultural
gulf between persons educated under such broad disciplines and physicians.
When an outsider sees physicians making what appear to be ad hoc, case
by-case decisions, the r eality is often profoundly different. Medical students
and residents are as rule-oriented as law or philosophy students. The cases
they discuss are often exceptions to an unarticulated rule unknown to the
outsider, or are surrogates for complex rules in a shorthand discussion of
which theory should govern the patient's care. 46 This is especially likely
43. ROTHMAN, supra note I, at 7.
44. It might be expected that the bar examinations would force a great degree of homogeneity

on law school teaching. This does not happen, however, because in each state a private company
runs a comprehensive, lengthy bar review cram course to give all students the minimal knowledge
necessary to pass the state's bar examination. Given the limited focus of the bar examinations, it is
an open question whether the average law school admittee could do equally well on the bar examination
by skipping law school and taking the bar review course.
45. Most important is that law is not a well-defined subject, changing from state to state and

from case to case. Law students are taught to analyze problems and to look up the relevant law.
. assumes that the lawyer has the time to investigate the facts and do detailed research on the
This

�

law

�

Phy icians are eldom able to make decisions at such a leisurely pace. Edward P. Richards,
:
Lmng with Uncertainty: lnfor,mation Theory and Clinical Decision Making, s J. INTENSIVE CARE
MED.

91 (1990) .

. 46. There is an ther old joke

n he mystery created by shared background: A sociologist visits
.
a prison warden to discuss the poss1b1hty of doing research in the prison. The warden takes her on

�

� �
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when the outsider only sees the "interesting cases;" those brought to the
attention of ethics committees, those used as teaching m aterial, or just
those that are unusual enough that they are discussed around the department
coffee pot.

V.

MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION

No area of bioethical inquiry is more thoroughly grounded in horrible
facts than is medical research. Modern bioethics, as it concerns medical
experimentation,47 begins with the Nuremberg trials

and the resulting

Nuremberg Code. 48 Of all the atrocities of the Nazi concentration camps,
perhaps the most disturbing were the medical experiments. This was not
due to their brutality alone, for in the context of the death camps, relative
brutality is meaningless. The medical experiments were abhorrent because
they were performed by physicians, mocking the expected dedication of
physicians to their patients' well-being.49
The Nuremberg Code arose from the trial of Karl Brandt. It was
a code of ethics governing human experimentation, but its

intended to be

emphasis on patient autonomy was the first major break from the pater
nalistic model for the physician-patient relationship.50 It was generally
ignored, however, 51 because most p hysicians saw the Nuremberg Code as
irrelevant to their practices: the acts of monsters such as Dr. Mengele
a tour of the cell-block. As they pass the cells, they hear a prisoner call out "47!". This is immediately
followed by guffaws of laughter. Soon another prisoner calls out "53", which is also followed by
laughter. The sociologist, baffled, asked the warden what was going on. He replied that the prisoners
all knew the same jokes, so they had numbered them to make it easier to tell them in the confusion
of the cellblock. Calling out the number was telling the joke. (The joke continues that the sociologist
calls out a number and is greeted by silence. The warden explains that the humor is all in the
delivery.)

47. For a broad investigation of human experi mentation, including social science research, see
JAY KATZ, EXPERIMENTATION WITH HUMAN B EINGS (1972).

48. Nuremberg Code, 2 TRIALS OF WAR. CR.WrnALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MnrrAR.Y TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 181-82 (1949) reprinted in ROBERT J. LEVrNE, ETHICS AND
REGULAT ION OF CLrNICAL RESEARCH 425 (1981).
49. Less well known, but perhaps more disquieting, physicians were well represented in the SS
itself. In general, see R OBERT J. LIFTON, THE NAZI DocTORS: MEDICAL KnLINO AND THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF GENOCIDE (1986).
SO. a. T h e voluntary consent of t h e human subject is abso l u t e l y essential.
This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent: should be
so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice without the intervention of any
elem ent of force, fraud, deceit, duress, overreaching, or other ulterior form of constraint
or coercion and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of

the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an understanding and enlightened
decision. This latter element requires that before the acceptance of an affirmative decision
by the experimental subject there should be made known to him the nature, duration, and
purpose of the experiment; the method and means by which it is to be co�ducted; all
inconveniences and hazards reasonably to be expected; and the effects upon his health or
person which may possibly come from his participation in the experiment.
Nur emberg Code, 2 TRIAL S OF WAR CIUMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MnrrA RY TRIBUNALS UNDER
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 181-82 (1949) reprinted in ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND
REGU LATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 425 (1981).
on medical
s 1. For a f a s cinating history of t h e Nuremb erg Code and legal deci ion
Birthmark:
The
s
Mengele
Annas,
J.
George
see
expe rimentation both pre-Code and post-Code,
Courts, 7 J . CoNTEMP. HEALTH L. & Pot'Y 17 (1991).
Nur

�

d

emberg Co e in United States
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were too far removed from clinical research in the United States . 52
Ironically, the horror of the Nazi death camp experiments was so great
that physicians distanced themselves from it in the same way that non
physicians distance themselves from the horrors of routine medical prac
tice. It was more than fifteen years after the promulgation of the Nurem
berg Code before the ethics of medical research in the United States was
seriously questioned.
Professor Rothman begins his discussion of medical research with the
end of the "golden age" - the pub lication of Ethics and Clinical Research
in 1966.53 In this article, Professor Beecher discussed twenty-two examples
of unethical conduct by medical researchers . 54 The conduct decried by
Beecher was described by the scientists themselves in their articles and
was approved by the peer-reviewers who approved the articles for publi
cation. All the studies were performed after the promulgation of the
Nuremberg Code and would have been difficult or impossible to perform
if the provisions of the Code had been followed.
The unethical conduct complained of in most of these experiments
was a failure to obtain a proper consent from the patients who partici
pated. This was not a mere formality. A number of the experiments posed
substantial risks to the patients. In some cases, the risks were such as to
make the experiment ethically questionable, irrespective o f patient con
sent . 55 Beecher makes clear, however, that the unethical conduct in most
of these experiments was the result of "thoughtlessness and carelessness,
not wilful disregard for the patient's rights .
52.

.

.

.

"56

It is not a fictional villain but a flesh-and-blood murderer, Josef Mengele, who sets the

modern standard for experimentation atrocities. By almost any measurement , Mengele, the "Angel
of Death," was one of the most notorious of the Nazi physicians. Eyewitness accounts summarize
the cold brutality and murder of this M.D .-Ph.D. "man of science." Some of his most horrifying
work involved genetically-related experiments performed on children who were twins, many of whom
he personally murdered. In an affidavit, one of his prison assistants, Dr. Miklos Nyiszli, describes
h"w Mengele once killed fourteen Gypsy twins himself:
In the work room next to the dissecting room, fourteen Gypsy twins were waiting and
crying bitterly. Dr. Mengele didn't say a single word to us, and prepared a IO cc and a

5

cc syringe. From a box he took Evipal and from another box he took chloroform, which
was in

20

cc glass containers, and put these on the operating table. After that the first

twin was brought in . . . a fourteen year old girl. Dr. Mengele ordered me to undress the
girl and put her head on the dissecting table. Then he injected the Evipal into her right
arm intravenously. After the child had fallen asleep, he felt for the left ventricle of the
heart and injected

10 cc

of chloroform . After one little twitch the child was dead , whereupon

Dr. Mengele had her taken into the corpse chamber. In this manner all fourteen twins
were killed during the night.
Id.

53.
54.
5� .

Henry K. Beecher , Ethics and Clinical Research,
Id. at 1355-59.

�

274

NEw ENG. J. MED.

1 354 (1966).

W ile �ach of the experiments posed a substantial risk
to the patients involved, there were
.
few serious 1�1uries.
In only one case was there clear evidence that the experime
nt caused the death
of an otherwise healthy person. In this experiment, a malignan
t melanoma (a fast growing and deadly
.
skm �ancer) was transplanted into a healthy volunteer. The
callus disregard for the patient in this
experiment approached the level of that displayed in
some of the Nazi experiments. Id. at 1359.
56. Id. at 1356.
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1 966 article, Professor Rothman jumps

back to turn of the century and presents an excellent history of medical
research in the United States.57 He reviews the development of medical
research in the United States. The purpose of this review is to demonstrate
the development of the arrogance and self-assurance

of the medical

research community that led to the thoughtlessness and carelessness ob
served by Beecher.
Professor Rothman successfully conveys the development of the mind
set that puts research progress ahead of patient well-being. He then
demonstrates how abusive medical experiments were publicized to marshal
popular and legislative support for restrictions on human experimentation.
Most of these experiments were indefensible, justifying the call for more
effective regulation of human experimentation.58 Professor Rothman doc
uments the resulting reforms, including stringent requirements on informed
consent,59 limitations on research on children and bans on research in
volving prisoners.
He also recognizes that these regulations, born of a fear of sinister
researchers conducting horrible experiments, have two central weaknesses.
First, the primary vehicle for enforcing the regulations is the Institutional
Review Board (IRB), a committee appointed by the institution performing
the research. Institutions are free to appoint anyone to an IRB, they may
remove troublesome members from the IRB and a few IRBs are empow
ered to determine whether the experimenters actually follow the informed
consent protocols approved by the IRB.60
As Professor Rothman makes clear, the operative assumption behind
the reform o f rules governing human experimentation is that scientists
cannot be trusted. 6 1 Yet, in most cases, persons who distrust scientists are
not opposed to medical research. The most obvious examples are ACT
UP62 and other victims advocacy groups who decry current research efforts
while demanding more research into their ailment. This leads to the second
problem with these regulations:
On the balance, however, the procedures to protect human experimentation
are so firmly entrenched that the central issue now, in view of the AIDS
crisis, is not how to protect the human subject from the investigator but
how to ensure that all those w h o wish to be human subjects have a fair
S7. ROTHMAN, supra note I, at I S-79.
S8. One of the worst was the Tuskegee syphilis experiment. This study on the long-term
consequences of syphilis infection began in 1 932. A large group of black men infected with syphilis
were followed to determine the natural history of the disease. This was questionable in 1932. It was
inexcusable in 1946 when penicillin became generally available to treat syphilis. See JAMES H. JONES,
BAD BLOOD: THE TUSICEOEE SYPHll.IS EXPERIMENT (1981); Pollard v. United States, 69 F.R . D . 646
(M.D. Ala. 1976).
59. See Protection of Human Subjects; I nformed Consent; Standards for Institutional Review
Boards for Clinical Investigations, 56 Fed. Reg. 28,02.5 (1991) (to be codified at 21 C . F . R. pt . .5 1 ,
.56).
60. ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 2S2.
6 1 . RoTHMAN, supra note 1, at 100.
62. AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power, the advocacy group founded by author Larry Kramer.
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opport unity to enter a protocol. The nightmare image has s.hifted from
an unscrupulous researcher taking advantage of a helpless inmate t<;> a
dying patient desperate to join a drug trial and have a ch��ce at bfe.
.
The backlash against the IRB is spurred not by researchers 1mp�t1e nce
with bureaucratic delays but by patients w ho want to make the1� own
calculations of risks and benefits and to decide for themselves, without
the veto power of the IRB, whether a protocol i s wort� entering . Altho� g h

this reorientation in large measure reflects the gnm fate confrontmg
persons with AIDS, it also testifies to how effectively the IRBs have
trained, really tamed, the researcher.63

"Trained and tamed . " Precisely correct, but incomplete. In their zeal
to eliminate horrible experiments, reformers ignored a critical issue: why
do great scientists do research and what happens if they stop? This is
critical because of the tension between limiting the prerogatives of scientists
while trying to encourage medical research.

Having been involved in

medical research and having served on IRBs, I believe that there have
been profound changes in medical research, but that IRBs have been
almost irrelevant to this change.
The best science is driven by a lust for knowledge and the all
consuming excitement that comes with doing productive research on
important problems. Where ethicists and lawyers see horrible things being
done to patients without their informed consent, researchers see a path
to an important discovery. perhaps the cure to a scourge afflicting millions
of people. A prime motivation of great scientists is the thrill of solving
difficult problems and explicating the laws of the universe.
W hile biocthicists sec the increased protection of human subjects as
the central change in medical research, the most important change has
been in funding priorities and grant oversight . IRBs are only a small part
of the bureaucrat ization of science. In general, reformers of science,
including biocthicists and lawyers, see science as a commodity. If you
believe that science is a commodity, then it is reasonable that y o u can
direct scientific discoveries by how you allocate grant money . This process
started with the "war on cancer . "
T h e war on cancer dictated that federal research funds b e reallocated
to scientists working on cancer cures. In following the war metaphor,

money was also shifted into giant research organizations, aping the
Manhattan Project' s approach to building the atomic bomb. Biomedical
;dentists had to work on cancer-related projects or lose their funding.
The directors of large laboratories became increasingly powerful, at the
expense of individual scientists. As grants became much larger. Congress
dem � nded increasing oversight of grant funds . Grant applications required

mass i v e paper wor k that specified in detail what the scientist expected to
_

accomplish and how the money would be spent .

Th� war on cancer

failed .

Some

incremental progress was made, but

no m �gic bullet was found . While it should have been clear that the grand
experim ent of checkbook science had failed, i t became impossible to go
6 .l. RoTH M A N , 111pra

no1r

I , al 2 5 2 .
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back. Great scientists had been turned into laboratory directors responsible
for obtaining grants to pay the s a laries of tens to hundreds of people.
Having sold their souls to build research empires, they found they could
no longer do research.64 They had become full-time fund-raisers. They
were tamed by the federal regulations on obtaining and spending grant
money, not by IRBs.
This taming of the medical research establishment, with all its costs
in lost creativity and careers ruined by arbitrary changes in federal grant
priorities, did not greatly decrease unethical research. The reason is simple:
formal medical research has alway s been a very small part of medical
practice. Most medical research, including some of the most abusive,
masquerades a s patient care. Treating physicians trying "something new"
have always posed far greater risks than the most determined medical
scientists.
These a b uses are greatest f o r medical and surgical procedures.65
Paradoxicall y ,

we have created

a system where there is little or no

regulation of unproven or even previously untried procedures. As long as
physicians performing procedures charge the patient for the procedure
and call it therapy, they are immune from IRB review and most other
restrictions on human experimentation.66
The most extreme result of this immunity from review is that major
medical industries will develop around unproven treatments. Once such
treatments are institutionalized, they are almost impossible to dislodge.
While there have been many examples of treatments adopted without
proper proof of their efficacy, 67 all pale before the coronary artery bypass
(CAB) industry. Approximately

1 5 years elapsed between the introduction

of CABs and the results of the first controlled clinical trials of their
efficacy. During this period CABs became a multi-billion dollar a year
business, and many of the CAB s urgeons became millionaires.
Perhaps most importantly, this period saw a million or more, mostly
middle and

u p per class, white men undergo the procedure. Anyone

64 . The story of Faust's bargain with the devil remains the classic picture of scientific curiosity
combined with ambition. JOHANN GOETHE, FAUST: A TRAGEDY (C. Thomas ed . , 1 892).
6S . "Procedure" is used as a general term for invading the patient's body with various
instruments. At one time, most procedures were performed by surgeons and involved what is
trad itionally thought of as surgery. Most specialties have developed an armamentarium of invasive
procedures . These i nclude cardiologists doing angiography and angioplasty, internists doing endoscopy
and surgica l procedures through the endoscope, to gynecologists performing lyposuction . Procedures
generate a lot of money for a limited amount of patient contact time . An hour spent doing a detailed
medica l history and counseling a patient might only generate a $40-$100 fee, while an hour spent
performing a procedure can generate a $2000 fee. This is in addition to equal or higher charges by
the hospital or outpatient surgical center for the equipment and support team.
66. How can this be? Unlike drugs and medical devices, which must be declared
safe and effective by the U.S. Food & Drug Administration, the decision to adopt a new
surgical procedure-w hether RK or coronary bypass-is left in the hands of those who
perform it. " The only effective regulation is after-the-fact malpractice," says George J .

Annas, professor of health law a t Boston University.
Karen Freifeld, Myopic Haste? (100,000 plus have had new eye surgery), FORBES, May 6, 1985 at
9S(2).
67. For an excellent chronicle of medical fads, see CHARLES L. BosK, FORGIVE & REMEMBER:
MANAOINO MEDICAL FAILURE (1979).
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challenging the appropriateness of this treatme n t would face the wrath of
both

well-financed medical lobby and these "satisfied customers "
:
Understandably, these patients would be unwilling to confront the reabty
a

that t hey might have undergone unnecessary , expensive and dangerous
surgery. Even today, after many studies have demonstrated that t�e
procedure is only beneficial in limited circumstances,68 many persons still
undergo unnecessary CABs.
While CABs are the biggest success story in the sell-it then test-it
school of medical progress, the most outrageous attempt to prevent the
investigation of an unproven procedure was mounted by a group of
ophth a lmolog ists These ophthalmologists performed radial keratotomies,
.

a procedure where the cornea is sliced to change its optical properties.

The procedure was developed in the Soviet Union and introduced into
th e U n ited States without clinical trials. This is a quick procedure and

one that, in its height, would net its practition ers about $ 1000 an eye. A
phy s ician who could recruit enough business c ould do several of these a
day for all the working days in a year.
When the National Eye I nstitute set up a study panel to determine
if this procedure was safe and effective, the physicians participating in

the study panels found themselves the target of a lawsuit by the
ophtha lmologists performing the procedure. 69 The complaint alleged that

the panel members conspired to interfere with the businesses o f the
ophthalm o logists perfo rmin g the procedure. W hat was the interference?
The panel called the procedure experimental, thus raising a question about
whether insurers shou ld pay for the procedure. 70
The use of legal process by a well-financed group to prevent the

invest igation of an unproven treatment is the logical extension

of a

regu latory system that makes it di fficult to perform research w hile not

addre ss i n g unethical practices b y non-scientist physicians . Ironically, this
h ap pe n s because even unethical researchers work in the open. Beecher' s
pioneering article and i nves tig ation o f unethical research practices was
only possible because researchers must publish t heir work to survive. This
makes researchers easy targets for bioethicists and lawyers who fasten

onto the horrible facts in printed accounts to shape regulatory policy. In
cont rast

,

unethical practitioners offering unproven procedures as therapy

are carefully shielded from scrutiny by privacy laws developed to protect
.
patients .
VI.

PARENTS

v.

CHILDREN

-

BABY DOE AND

NANCY CRUZAN
O n e of the most di fficult problems in bioethics is th e conflict o f
.
rights bet ween family members, i n most cases , r ights o f childr en a n d their
lltt

68 · Euamc Braunwald, FJf«ts of coronary

y bypass gr<ifting on survival: Implications of
ro�do ';:ud rnronary·a".tr.v SUrftry study, 309-arttr
NEW ENO. J . MED. 1 181-84 (1983).

: hachar \. . . American Academy of Ophthalmoloay, Inc.,
870 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1989);
\l. anna. SM f . Supp. 674 ( N . D . Ga. 1983).
7o . Cohn Norman , Clinical Trial Stirs ltgal
Battlts: ltgal Disputt.s in A tlanta and Chicago
0�r Surrtry for . ..f.vopio Raist l.uut of How Contro
vtrsial Surgical T«hniquts Should be Assured'
227 Sc l li S ('f I J l 6 ( 1 9115).
·

.

\ nt

1< .
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parents. The context o f these conflicts changes throughout t he life cycle:
starting with abortion; moving through duties to protect t h e fetus; the
right to refuse medical care for a severely impaired newborn ; the duty to
properly care for children; the right of minors to independent medical
care including abortion; decision on the termination o f lifesupport for
children; and, ultimately, the decision to terminate lifesupport for one's
parents .
Most bioethicists have tried to resolve these conflic t s by appeals to
autonomy: whoever has the right t o autonomy wins. This is a circular
solution , however, because they have not articulated a clear rule that
establishes who should get aut onomy. They are left to resolve inconsis
tencies through ad hoc decisions and silence . The hardest of these incon
sistencies is treatment for damaged newborns, where the rights of the
parents , the newborn and the disabled collide.

A.

The Baby Doe Regulations

Professor Rothman illustrates this coJiision by his account of the
political maneuverings leading to the Baby Doe rules. 71 The Baby Doe
rules72 mandated that severely impaired newborns be given all indicated
medical . treatment , irrespective o f parental wishes. The regulations were
inspired by Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 73 which outlaws dis
crimination against the handicapped .
Parents

of severely impaired

newborns told horrifying stories of

children condemned to lives of hopeless despair. 74 Bioethicists, focusing
on these horror stories, bitterly opposed the Baby Doe rules for interfering
with the parents right of self-deter mination.75 In doing so, however, they
ignored the message implicit
withhold care .

in

allowing these parent s to choose to

Allowing parents to withhold care from defective newborns was at
odds with efforts to protect children from abuse and n eglect and with
ethical arguments made on behalf of the handicapped that their lives were
fully as valuable as those of the non-handicapped. Advocacy groups for
the handicapped raised a very d ifficult issue: Was it so very wrong for a
severely disabled person, making the most of his or her abilities, to protest
when an equally disabled baby is allowed to die because its parents see
its life as a burden to the child and to themselves? This question has
gone unanswered, continuing to poison the debate over the rights of the
disab led versus their parents.
Outside of the abortion debate , the conflict of rights between parents

and children has been the most bitter of the debates over limiting the
7 1 . ROTHMAN, supra note 1, at 1 90-22 1 .
72. Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ S l O l -OS ( 1 984).
73. Rehab ilitation Act of 1973, § 7(7)(8)(ii)(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. § 706(8)(B)(ii)(West
Supp. 1 992)).
74. ROBERT AND PEGGY STINSON, THE LoNO 0YINO OF BABY ANDREW ( 1983).
7S. See Stephen A . Newman, Baby Doe, Congress and the States: Challenging the Federal
Treatment Standard for Impaired Infants, 1 5 AM. J.L. & MED. 1 (1 989).
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freedom of pregnant women in order to protect their unborn ch ldr�n. In

� �

this debate, which archetypically involves a pregnant woman abus1 g Il egal
drugs, the ethically approved view is that the pregnant woman s nghts
completely trump any right of society to prot�ct the fetus . 16
This is a logical approach if the underlymg agenda .is to protect a
woman's right to chose abortion : if abortion is always assumed to be
available
always

however
diately

then it is illogical to restrict the rights of a woman if she can

�nd

the restrictions by aborting the fetus .77 It is in conflict,

with the efforts to protect the child's rights that begin imme

�t the birth

of the child, at least with the birth of a perfect child.

Trying to make the moment of birth a mystical dividing line between
absolute rights of mother and child is inviting legal disaster. The Supreme
Court and many legislatures abhor legal asymmetries. If they are con
fronted with an argument that birth is magic because prior to birth the
woman has a right to abortion, then they are more likely to limit that
right of abortion than to accept a system that allows a pregnant crack
head to injure her baby.
8

.

.

The Right to Die

.
These conflicts and the inconsistencies in their resolution by bioeth
icists become most obvious in the debates over the right to die. No issue
has preoccupied bioethicists more than the right of a patient to refuse
medical care, particularly in the face of a terminal illness. Professor
Rothman presents a concise, if traditional, history of the problem . 78 His
discussion is centered on the Quinlan case, 79 Cruzan80 not having been
decided when he completed his m anuscript.
I do not intend to review the right to refuse medical care debate in
this article . 11 I will focus, instead on two unpleasant points that are
generally ignored by bioethicists : 1) the hypocrisy in simultaneously viii76. J. Gallagher ct al., Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 3 1 6 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1 1 9296 (1987); G . J . Annas, The Impact of Medical Technology on the Pregnant Woman 's Right to
Privacy, 13 AM . J . L . & MED. 2 1 3-32 (1989); D. Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts
With Women 's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L . J . 599625 ( 1986); M.A. Field, Controlling the Woman to Protect the Fetus. , 17 LAW MED. HEALTH CA&E .
1 14-29 (1989); A.C.L.U. Criminal Prosecutions for Fetal Abuse Increasing at Alarming Rate. 1
Reprod Rights Update 2 (Sept. 1 , 1989); Note , Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against
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fying and sentimentalizing the family, depending on the legal issue; and

2)

the economics of death.
C.

Cutting Families to Fit the Conclusions

The hypocrisy is best illustrated in the contrast between two dissenting
Supreme Court opinions filed o n the same day. The first was in a case
contesting Ohio's requirement that minors seeking abortion must either

tell their parents or get the approval of a judge :82

Sadly, not all children in our country are fortunate enough to be members
of loving families. For too many young pregnant women, parental
involvement in this most intimate decision threatens harm, rather than
promises c omfort. The Court ' s selective blindness to this stark social
reality is bewildering and distressing. Lacking the protection that young
people typically find in their intimate family associations , these minors
are desperately in need of constitutional protection. The sexually or
physically abused minor may indeed be "lonely or even terrified," not
of the abortion procedure, but o f an abusive family member. The Court's
placid reference to the "compassionate and mature" advice the minor
will receive from within the family must seem an unbelievable and cruel
irony to those children trapped in violent fa milies. 83

I believe that this is an accurate statement of the situation of some
minors seeking abortion. Even though many may have supportive parents,
it is unreasonable for the court to assume that all parents will unselfishly
put their child's interests first. I n contrast, however, is the dissent from

Cruzan, decided on the same day:
The majority justifies its position by arguing that, while close family
members may have a strong feeling about the question , "there is no
automatic assurance that the view o f close family members will necessarily
be the same as the patient's would have been had she been confronted
with the prospect of her situation while competent . " I cannot quarrel
with this o bservation. But it leads only to another question: Is there any
reason to suppose that a State is more likely to make the choice that the
patient would have made than someone who knew the patient intimately?
To ask this is to answer it. As the New Jersey Supreme Court observed:
"Family members are best qualified to make substituted judgments for
incompetent patients not only because of their peculiar grasp of the
patient ' s approach to life, but also because of their special bonds with
him or her . . . . It is . . . they who treat the patient as a person, rather
than a symbol of a cause . " The State, in contrast, is a stranger to the
patient.84

If this romantic picture of the family were transposed to the

Akron

decision, it would be a persuasive argument for the state ' s right to require
parental notification, if not parental consent. I believe that the dissent in

Akron is correct, but I do not believe that bioethicists and liberal supreme
court justices can have it both ways. While some scholars attempt to
distinguish

A kron from Cruzan by stressing that Nancy Cruzan was

82. Ohio v Akron Cntr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502 (1990).
83. Akron, 1 10 S. Ct. at 2991-92 (citations omitted).
84. Cruzan, 1 10 S. Ct. at 2877.
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incompetent, this seems irrelevant to the question of family good will and
motivation. 85
VII.

The Economics of Death

As a teacher of medical l aw , I find my students least objective about
the financial aspects of medical care delivery. Even when they believe that
physicians are motivated only by money, they are unwilling to accept the
logical consequences of that assumption. So it is with the right-to-die
controversy. First, it is important to remember that the vast majority of
right-to-die decisions involve persons over sixty-five who are covered by
Medicare. Young persons in persistent vegetative states are so rare as t o
have a de minimus impact o n the medical system.
In simple terms, prior to 1 983 physicians and hospitals made money
by keeping patients alive. The more machines the patient was connected
to, the more tests that were ordered, the more days that patient was in
the hospital, the more money the government paid the physicians and the
hospital . Putting aside the very real emotional concerns about physicians
being un willing to face death, about the technological imperative and all
the other psychological games associated with pulling the plug on patients ,
it was ext remely profitable to keep patients around.
In 1 983 the game changed . Medicare instituted a prospective payment
system based on diagnosis related groups (DRGs). Under DRGs, the
government pays hospitals a fixed amount for each patient, based on that
patient ' s diagnosis. For example, the government might pay the hospital

S l0,000 to care for a patient with pneumonia. The hospital would receive
the same amount of money , irrespective of the patient's hospital course.
If the patient had a simple, uncomplicated recovery, he or she might be
discharged in a few days, with a net profit to the hospital. On the other
hand , if the patient developed severe complications and was in the hospital
for 3 weeks, the hospital would still receive only $ 10,000 . In this case,
the hospital would lose money.
DR Gs turned medical finance on its head . 86 Suddenly physicians who

had been the darlings of the hospital because of their lengthy hospitali
zations and profligate ordering o f tests became menaces to the hospital's
bottom line." Physicians were suddenly under pressure to provide less
care

and to get the patients out of the hospital faster.88 It was not lost

on hospital administrators that if a patient refuses care and dies on day
8 5 . What if the state allowed the parents of an incompet
ent pregnant minor (perhaps injured
.
.
in an auto acc1den1 ) to decide
whether the minor could be aborted while she slept?
86. K . E . Powerly & E. Smith, The Impact of DRGs on
Health Care Workers and their Clients,
1 9 HUTINOS CENTEl REP. 1 6 ( 1 989).
87 .It comes as a shock to many law students that hospitals
maintain elaborate records of the
:
profi1ab 1l11y o f each physician on their medical staffs.
88 Th e c� rrcnt law ass�gns the liability for premature
discharg e to the physician. Irrespective
.
or the hosptta
l s threats, which can .include termination of
medi' cal staff pnv1
· ·1eges, th e ph ys1c1an
.
.
cannot plea d duress in a mc<11cal
malpractice lawsuit based on a premature discharg
e. See Wicklin e
.
.
v . Cahforn ta'
28 Cal . Rptr. 66 1 ( 2 nd Dist . 1 986). See also Thomas
H. Boyd, Cost Containment
.
and th«- Ph_l'SIC'lan .s F1duc1ary Duty to th«' Patient,
39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 3 1 ( 1 989).
·
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two, the hospital makes even more money than if the patient has a quick
recovery.
In my work with legal issues in critical care medicine, most of the
physicians I encounter are faced with pressures to deny a p propriate care
much more frequently than they see disputes on the right-to-die. I find it
interesting that there has been almost no discussion in the ethics literature
of the benefit to the government and other insurers in frightening the
elderly and the infirm into refusing care. 89 Many who criticize physicians
as too ready to com promise their patients' interests for money seem ready
to assume that this motivation somehow does not apply to right-to-die
decisions.
VIII.

CONCLUSIONS

In his epilogue, Professor Rothman asks whether bioethics is unduly
focused on the rights of individua ls, without proper concern for the good
of society in general. While a def ender of individual rights, Professor
Rothman points out that they do have a cost.
I propose that, on balance, p atients' real gains from the involvement
of outsiders in medical decision-making have been more than offset by
the losses in a u tonomy due to managed care and other changes in medical
care finance. Moreover, outsiders have exacerbated this loss of patient
autonomy b y decrying the motives and sincerity of those physicians who
have tried to act as advocates f o r their patients' rights.
Ethicists and lawyers must be more sensitive to the unintended
consequences of their rules. This i s especially important as private health
insurers and the government attempt to reduce the cost of medical care.
It is much more important to protect the rights of all patients to quality
care than to focus on horrible facts that have little significance in routine
medical practi ce.

89. For a refreshingly contrary view, see Nat Hentoff, Deciding Who Dies, THE WASHINGTON
Posr, Oct. 26, 1 99 1 , at A21 ; Nat Hentoff, When a Hospital Goes to Court to End a Life, THE
WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 28, 1991, at A27; Nat Hentoff, Who Really Won the Cruzan Decision?,
THE WASHINGTON POST, July 14, 1990, at A l 9; Nat Hentoff, The Quality of Life - and Death,
THE WASHINGTON Posr, March 17, 1990, at A29; Nat Hentoff, Two Cheers for the ACLU, THE
WASHINGTON PosT, March 3, 1990, at A25; Nat Hentoff, Right to Die? Isn 't It Really About the
Right to Live?, THE WASHINGTON PosT, Nov. 25, 1989, at A23; Nat Hentoff, Not a 'Hopeless Case '
After All, THE WASHINGTON PosT, April 29, 1989, at A25; Nat Hentoff, Let Her Die? Or Make Her
Die?, THE WASHINGTON Posr, Dec. 3 1 , 1988, at A l 9; Nat Hentoff, Euthanasia: Another Warning
From the Surgeon Genera l, THE WASHINGTON Posr, April I I , 1987, at A2 1 .

